Reexamining MRW
In this section we first describe and comment on MRW's methodology for attributing differences in output to differences in productivity vs. differences in capital intensity. We then update MRW's estimates and make a series of modifications, such as incorporating primary school data and a more labor-intensive technology for producing human capital.
MRW specify the production technology Y = C + IK + IH = KaHI(AL)'-a-,
where Y is output, K and H are stocks of physical and human capital, A is a productivity index, and L is the number of workers. H = hL, where h is human capital per worker. Implicit is an infinite-lived representative agent whose time enters production through dual components, human capital H and raw labor L.6 As shown in (1), MRW specify the same technology for producing human and physical capital. Time subscripts are suppressed, as are the standard accumulation equations for K and H. MRW assume that both stocks depreciate geometrically at a rate of 3% per year. If one adds competitive output and input markets and constant relative risk aversion utility, then it is well known that higher A will induce proportionate increases in K and H. Given this fact, rather than the usual accounting exercise that assigns output or its growth rate to contributions from K, H, L, and A, we think MRW rightly rearrange (1) to yield Y / K a/(ia-) H\/(1-a-)
where X is a composite of the two capital intensities. We concur with MRW's adoption of (2) for two reasons. First, Y/L is the object of interest rather than Y, since we want to understand why output per worker varies across countries, leaving aside how a country's number of workers L is determined.7 The A-vs.-X debate really has nothing to do with the determination of L. Second, (2) gives A "credit" for variations in K and H generated by differences in A. The contributions of K and H
Formally, the efficiency units contributed by a worker with human capital h are e = h(l -a)A(-a-)/(1-a)
, and the production function is Y = KEl-", where E = eL.
7. argue that hours worked in the market (as opposed to home production) by the average worker varies a lot across countries, making the number of workers a poor measure of market labor input. If, as these authors argue, market hours per worker are much higher in richer countries, it should contribute to higher A in richer countries.
variations that are not induced by A are captured by variations in capital intensity X. This decomposition was also adopted by King and Levine (1994) , albeit for a setting with physical capital but not human capital. We offer two caveats to the decomposition in (2), both related to A being endogenous, say resulting from technology adoption decisions.8 First, one would expect that many country policies affect both A and X. Weak enforcement of property rights in a country, for example, is likely to decrease both A and X. We think the decomposition in (2) is still useful, however, because there are some policies that could affect one factor much more than the other (e.g., education policies). Thus, finding that high levels of output per worker are explained mostly by high levels of H/Y would suggest that differences in education policies are an important element in explaining international differences in output per worker. Similarly, finding that differences in K/Y are important in accounting for the international variation in output per worker would point towards capital taxation or policies that affect the relative price of investment goods.
The second related caveat concerning the decomposition in (2) is that, just as K and H are affected by A, A itself may be affected by capital intensity X. If A is determined by technology adoption, for instance, 8 . We do not list the embodiment of technology in physical capital as problematic for the decomposition in (2). Suppose that productivity entirely reflects the quality of physical capital, and that all countries invest in the highest quality capital goods available in the world in the period of investment. Then differences in country productivity levels could be due to differences in the vintage or age of a country's capital stock, i.e. unmeasured differences in the quality of a country's capital stock. In this situation, one might think (2) would attribute to productivity differences what in reality should be attributed to differences in physical capital intensity, say because countries with high investment rates and high capital intensity are using younger and therefore better equipment. If so, our results would understate the role of capital intensity in explaining international output differences. This concern turns out to be unfounded along a steady-state growth path. To see why, suppose the true, quality-adjusted capital stock evolves according to AKt = BtIt -8Kt, where A is the first-difference operator and B is an exogenous capital-embodied technology index which grows at the constant rate g and (recall) is the same for all countries. The intuition for this result is that a higher investment rate reduces the average age of the capital only temporarily, along the transition path. When the new steady-state path is reached with higher capital intensity, the age distribution of the capital stock-which is synonymous with the quality distribution-is the same as the distribution with a lower capital intensity. Thus a country with a permanently higher IIY than another country will have no younger or better capital and therefore no higher TFP.
then it is likely that higher schooling (i.e., higher H/Y) leads to a higher level of A. Once we obtain estimates of A and X, below we will actually use the decomposition of equation (2) Ignoring nonsecondary schooling (which we will find matters), the ratio is LHIL, the fraction of worker time spent in the human-capital sector.'0 Since in ( Table  II , restricted regression). The high R2 is the basis of Mankiw's (1995, p. 295) conclusion that "Put simply, most international differences in living standards can be explained by differences in accumulation of both human and physical capital."
Even assuming H/Y is measured properly, we are deeply uncomfortable with estimating a and 83 from an OLS regression of ln(Y/L) on ln(K/ Y) and ln(H/Y). Consistency of such estimates requires that ln(X) be orthogonal to ln(A). Yet countries with policies discouraging capital accumulation may also tend to have policies discouraging activites (such as technology adoption) which contribute to higher A. In Rodriguez-Clare (1997), one of us develops a quality ladder model wherein higher tariffs on imported capital goods result in both lower X (by reducing the investment rate) and lower A (by increasing the average distance between the quality of goods imported and the highest quality of goods available in the world).
Given the possibility that true X and true A are correlated, our preference is to use independent evidence to determine appropriate values of a and /, and then use them to construct X and A. This being said, a = 0.30 is actually in the ballpark of estimates obtained using national income accounts (see Gollin, 1996 Using data from Barro and Lee (1993), the MRW3 row of Table 1 Comparing MRW4 with MRW3, we see that lowering the capital intensity of human capital production modestly lowers the variation of Hy/Y across countries. As shown by comparing MRW0 with MRW4 in Table 1 , the cumulative effect of these modifications is to remove the linchpin of the neoclassical revival: MRW's original (78%, 22%) decomposition has given way to a (33%, 67%) decomposition. Can one restore MRW's results with a higher 3? Doubling 3 from 0.28 to 0.56 yields a (51%, 49%) division. As ,3 rises toward 23, the decomposition approaches 60% vs. 40%. Thus a sufficiently high 3 does generate results that, although not as dramatic as those of MRW, still have the major part of international income variation explained by differences in levels of physical and human capital per worker. But what is the right value for 3? Unfortunately, we know of no independent estimates of "the" share of human capital. Fortunately, in the next section we are able to exploit wage regressions to measure human-capital stocks in a way that does not depend on the value of 3. This regression evidence also appropriately weights primary schooling attainment relative to secondary schooling attainment, rather than lumping them together with equal weight as we have done in the preceding.
Using Mincer Regression Evidence to Estimate Human Capital Stocks
In this section we exploit evidence from the labor literature on the wage gains associated with more schooling and experience. For a cross section of workers, Mincer (1974) ran a regression of worker log wages on worker years of schooling and experience. He chose this specification because it fit the data much better than, say, a regression of the level of wages on the years of schooling and experience. To incorporate this evidence into the technology for producing human capital, we abandon the infinite-life construct in favor of a life cycle in which people first go to school full time and then work full time. We specify the following technology for human capital:
where hs is the human capital of somebody with s years of schooling, KH is the capital stock used in the education sector, LH is the number of students, and hT is the human capital of each teacher. Manipulating ( --^'M~~~~~ (7) < (8) Bils and Klenow (1996) look at Mincer regression studies covering 48 countries and find that the wage gain associated with an additional year of education averages 9.5% across the 48 countries and ranges from 5% to 15% for 36 of the 48 countries. Based on technologies (1) and (7), the percentage wage gain to a representative agent from one more year of schooling is /8y/(1-a). Therefore, to match an estimated wage gain of 9.5% we set y = 0.095(1-a)/,3. Table 2 presents results based on (7). The rows are labeled BKn because (7) is from Bils and Klenow (1996). As with MRW4 above, we use a = 0.30, f3 = 0.28, 4 = 0.4, and A = 0.5. For years of schooling s, row BK1 uses the level implied by the enrollment rates used in MRW3 and MRW4: s = 8 ? primary + 4 * secondary + 4 * tertiary. As the BK1 row shows, conditional on 1% higher Y/L we expect 0.60% higher X and 0.40% higher A. So switching from (6) used for MRW4 to (8) used for BK1 dramatically shifts the breakdown from (33%, 67%) to (60%, 40%). The exponential form of (7) implies that the higher the level of schooling, the bigger is the absolute amount of human capital obtained from the next year of schooling. The exponential form therefore puts more weight on secondary school enrollment than on primary school enrollment, moving us back toward MRW's 78%-vs.-22% breakdown.
One concern we have about BK1, as well as all of Table 1, Table 2 . As compared to the (56%, 44%) split in BK2, the split in BK3 is (53%, 47%). Underlying this breakdown of 53% ln(X) vs. 47% ln(A) is the supposition that the quality of schooling is much higher in richer countries. In richer countries, students enjoy better facilities (higher KH/LH) and better teachers (higher HHILH). From (9), the quality of schooling is quality of schooling = (KH/L-H)1 -h OAI .
Using this formula, for BK3 the elasticity of quality with respect to a country's Y/L is 0.95%.20 This means a country with 1% higher Y/L has 0.95% higher quality education. Note that higher quality of this type does not raise the percentage wage premium from education, but instead raises the base (log) wage for anyone in the country receiving some education. It should affect the intercept of the Mincer regression for a country, but not the coefficient on schooling.
Is an educational quality elasticity of 0.95% reasonable? Is it plausible that, like GDP per worker, the quality of education varies by a factor of about 34 across countries in 1985? An independent estimate of the quality elasticity can be gleaned from the wages of U.S. immigrants.21 Using 1970 and 1980 census data on the U.S. earnings of immigrants from 41 countries, Borjas (1987) estimates country-of-origin-specific intercepts in a Mincer regression of log wages on immigrant years of education and experience. He finds that immigrants with 1% higher per capita income in their country of origin exhibit a 0.116% higher wage intercept (stan-
Calculated as cov[ln(quality), ln(Y/L)]/var ln(Y/L).
21. Incidentally, the enormous pressure for migration from poor to rich countries is itself consistent with substantial differences in productivity across countries. However, this pressure could be entirely explained by higher physical capital-output ratios and greater nonpecuniary benefits of living in richer countries. dard error 0.025). This implies a quality elasticity of only 0.12%, suggesting that the elasticity embedded in BK3 is very aggressive.22'23 Borjas's evidence suggests an alternative, namely that teachers and class facilities affect school quality through the schooling coefficient y. In this event we would expect to see higher Mincer schooling coefficients in richer countries. Bils and Klenow (1996) find the opposite: each additional year of schooling brings roughly 10% higher wages in a country where the average worker has 5 years of schooling, compared to only about 5% higher wages in a country where the average worker has 10 years of schooling. Perhaps 's are higher in richer countries, but the effect on the education premium is more than offset by a lower relative marginal product of human capital in richer countries. This could arise because of imperfect substitutability of workers with different education levels combined with abundance of human capital in richer countries. Indeed, the Cobb-Douglas technology in (1) implies unit elasticity of substitution between human capital and raw labor and therefore a falling education premium with a country's H/Y, holding y constant.
It is interesting to explore the possibility that the Mincer coefficients already capture the effect of education quality combined with imperfect substitutability. This would correspond to the extreme case when teachers and class buildings affect only the /s, so that 4 = 0 and A = 1. It would be ideal to do this exercise using Mincer coefficients for each country, but unfortunately we do not have such data for all countries. Here we use the average Mincer coefficient of 9.5% instead. (The reader should note that, since the Mincer coefficient is actually declining with income per worker, this biases the results against a large role for A.) As we report in the BK4 row of We conclude that richer countries tend to have higher K/Y, higher H/Y, and higher A, with a dominant role for A, a large role for K/Y, and a modest-to-large role for H/Y. To us this says that theorizing about international output differences should center at least as much on differences in productivity as on differences in physical or human capital intensity. Figures 1 and 2 display ln(A) and ln(X) using MRWO and BK4, respectively.24 In the MRWO world, research should focus on explaining why ln(X) varies so much; in the BK4 world a greater priority is to understand differences in ln(A). Table 3a shows the correlation matrix for the case where HIY is measured according to MRWO; Table 3b In(X) Barro and Lee (1996) report percentages of the 25-64-year-old population in seven educational attainment categories: none, some primary, completed primary only, some secondary, completed secondary only, some tertiary, and completed tertiary. We treat "some" as half-completed, and assume the durations are 8, 4, and 4 years for primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling. We assume the first three categories are perfectly substitutable "primary equivalents," and that the last four are perfectly substitutable "secondary equivalents": where Ls is the number of working-age people in schooling group s. Note that this specification follows BK4 in eschewing Mincer-interceptaffecting school quality differences. We use nonlinear least squares to estimate or and y78/(1-a) using Barro and Lee's Ls data and Bils and Klenow's data on the estimated education premium for the 45 countries. The resulting estimates are y = 0.09(1-a)/f, and ar = 65.25 We then use these estimates to construct H aggregates for the 84 of our 98 countries for which Barro and Lee (1996) have the necessary schooling attainment data. The resulting breakdown is (40%, 60%), tilted a little toward ln(X) relative to the BK4 row, which uses y = 0.095(1-a)/l and ar = 1 (albeit with human capital vs. raw labor rather than primary equivalents vs. secondary equivalents). We conclude from this exercise that allowing for imperfect substitutability (and incorporating heterogeneity in schooling attainment within each country) does not significantly affect the results. Our next robustness check concerns the size of f. In the previous section we found that raising the value of this parameter boosted the role of human capital in explaining international income variation. This does not happen here. Here we choose the coefficients y in (7) and (9) so that the implied wage gain for each additional year of education, which is 25. This degree of substitutability is very high compared to the 1.5 estimated by Katz and Murphy (1992) for high-school vs. college equivalents in the United States. We have imposed a common y, however, so our high estimated substitutability may be capturing the combination of less substitutability and higher y's in richer countries.
In contrasting MRWO and BK4, it is instructive to look at the correlations among output per worker (Y/L), capital intensity (K/Y and H/Y), and productivity (A).
given by /3y/(l-a), matches the Mincer evidence discussed in Bils and Klenow (1996) . Thus changing 3 results in an offsetting adjustment in y to preserve the equality 3y/(l-a) = 9.5%. In other words, there is no doubling of the importance of human capital from doubling f to 0.56, since the coefficient y must be halved at the same time. Indeed, there is zero effect. The intuition is that the Mincer estimates pin down the combined effect of translating schooling into human capital and translating human capital into output. Thus a larger elasticity of output with respect to human capital requires a smaller elasticity of human capital with respect to schooling in order to maintain consistency with the Mincer regression evidence. An objection to the Mincer evidence is that the coefficient on schooling captures only private gains from schooling. Productive benefits of economywide human capital, as proposed by Lucas (1988) , would be absorbed in the Mincer intercept. Lucas (1990) argues that human capital externalities can explain the large differences in TFP that Krueger (1968) found across 28 countries even after adjusting for human capital per worker (measured much as in BK4). Leaving aside the nature of these externalities, it is illuminating to ask how big they have to be in order to restore MRW's 78%-vs.-22% breakdown. For BK3, with its substantial variation in education quality, we find that the social Mincer coefficient on schooling would have to be 15.6%, as opposed to the 9.5% or so typically found. For BK4, the social education premium would have to be 29%. Since the evidence on school quality favors BK4, it appears that external benefits of schooling would need to be larger than the private benefits! In any case, entertaining externalities leads to questions about their exact nature and transmission. To us, this supports our call for more research into the source of productivity differences across countries.
From Development Accounting to Growth Accounting
Whereas Tables 1 and 2 were concerned with development accounting (King and Levine's felicitous 1994 phrase), Table 4 is about growth accounting. For Table 4 we constructed K/Y and H/Y for each country in 1960 so that we could compute 1960-1985 growth rates. We did this for BK2 through BK4 (one cannot do it under the steady-state assumptions used for MRWs and for BK1). For H/Y we used Barro and Lee's (1993) schooling stocks in 1960 and, when necessary to construct experience levels, the United Nations (1994) population data for 1960. We estimated the 1960 Kl Y's as described in the previous section, and the results here are not at all sensitive to the various ways we tried to estimate 1960 K/Y's. Many countries surprisingly come out higher than the United States in our estimates for A. Perhaps we have been aggressive in our estimates of the return to human capital (e.g. making no attempt to adjust for ability bias), but we prefer to err on this side, given our conclusion that human capital's importance has been seriously overstated in previous research.
As we mentioned at the beginning of Section 2, the fact that A is not exogenous implies that the growth rate of A could be affected by the growth rate of K/Y and H/Y. Increasing levels of capital intensity and schooling could thus be responsible for high growth rates indirectly, by allowing for a faster growth of A. To examine this possibility Table 5 
Do Young's Findings Contradict Ours?
The debate over whether fast rates of growth in some countries stem from accumulation of capital or from technology catch-up has been heavily influenced by the East Asian miracles. It was initially thought that these countries had very high TFP growth rates, pointing to technology catch-up as the heart of the story. Then came the careful work of Alwyn Young showing that these countries grew mostly through input accumulation , and that their TFP growth rates were not extraordinarily high tables to illustrate the quantitative importance of these considerations. The annual growth rates of output and TFP, respectively, were 7.3% and 2.3% in Hong Kong, 8.7% and 0.2% in Singapore, 10.3% and 1.7% in South Korea, and 9.4% and 2.6% in Taiwan. So growth in output clearly came primarily from input accumulation. But the growth rates of output per worker and adjusted TFP-TFP raised to 1/ (1 -capital's share) because of its effect on capital accumulation-were as follows: 4.7% and 3.7% in Hong Kong, 4.2% and 0.3% in Singapore, 4.9% and 2.5% in South Korea, and 4.8% and 3.5% in Taiwan. So in three of the four East Asian miracles growth in output per worker came mostly from productivity gains.
In any case, the debate should not focus entirely on the miracle countries of East Asia. Although our data is much less detailed than the data Young compiled for each of the four Asian tigers, our hope is that by covering 98 countries we get a sense of whether Young's results are typical of the sources of growth differences in the world as a whole. We are particularly interested, therefore, in whether our results for the Asian 
